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IN THE SUPREME COURT
.OF THE STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., a corporation, ALMA H. COTTAM, MEEKS
WIRTHLIN and ADRIAN WRIGHT, a
partnership, doing business as Wright-Wirthlin Company, JOHN 0. SPECK, McDONALD BROS., INC., a corporation; JOSEPH
McDONALD; and KEITH L. KNIGHT, doing business as Knight Realty Company,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs.-

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation;
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE CITY, a body politic; the
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, a commission of Utah; ALEXANDER BUILDING CORPORATION OF
UTAH, a corporation; SHAW INC., a corporation; SOUTHEAST INC., a corporation;
SALT LAKE COUNTY CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT, a body politic; BERTHA SHEPHERD; BERNARD P. BROCKBANK, doing business as the Brockbank Realty and
Construction Company; GEORGE H.
SMEATH; MARY H. SMEATH, and J. K.
THAYN,

Case No.
8206

Defendants and Respondents.

Defendant's Brief
NATURE OF THE CASE AS IT AFFECTS THE
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT'S INTEREST
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District
was organized in September of 1951 under Title 79,
Chapter 9, U.C.A. 1953, for the purpose of furnishing

1
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domestic water to the .major portion of Salt Lake County
south of Salt Lake City. There are included within its
boundaries six cities and towns and several public utilities of which the plaintiff water company is one. It has
through the issuance of bonds and the levying of taxes,
expended over $1,000,000.00 for pipelines and has authorized an additional $1,275,000.00 in bonds. It has no
present dispute with Salt Lake City and does not anticipate that any serious dispute will arise. It 'vould, however, be seriously handicapped in performing its public
functions if Salt Lake City were here adjudged, as
against us, to have the unrestricted power to engage in
the retail water business within the boundaries of the
Conservancy District.
The case has three distinct phases. The first involves
the nature of the right of Salt J_Jake City to sell its surplus
water outside its limits. This involves the issue of
whether the city, through the sale of surplus water beyond its limits, is subject to. regulation either by the
courts or the Public Service Commission. We believe
that Salt Lake City does have the power to sell its surplus waters beyond its boundaries, but that in doing so
it can not discriminate between customers, nor charge
unreasonable rates; that it is either a "water corporation'', subject to regulation by the Public Service Commission, or the courts have the power to prohibit discrimination.
The second phas,e of the case involves the power of
a city to purchase and develop water and build facilities
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to permit it to engage in the water business generally
beyond its boundaries. A· city in pursuance of its municipal functions must develop water resources beyond its
immediate needs. It would be logical to hold that a surplus thus developed need not be wasted or left unused
until the city's need develops. Sales of such a surplus
beyond the city's boundaries are primarily for the benefit
of the inhabitants ·of the city, and the sale beyond the
boundaries is but an incident. This is far different from
a situation where a city has all of its 'vater supplies in
use and is compelled to buy water itself to meet its own
needs. Notwithstanding the fact that it has no surplus,
it buys water from some organization like a metropolitan
water district for the purpose of reselling that water at
a profit beyond its boundaries. This involves not only
the acquisition of water to permit the city to engage in
the water business for a profit beyond its limits, but
also the power of a city to use its funds for development
and extensions of its system within the County, not to
permit it to market a surplus, but to permit it to stay in
an expanding water business which proves profitable.
Even though the city has 'the po"\ver to market its surpluses built up to meet its reasonable needs, 've deny
that any city has the power to engage in the vvater business generally.
The third phase of the case involves the respective
power of adjoining public municipal districts. The
power of the city to market its surplus water, as suggested in phase 1 above, and the power of the city to
engage in the water business beyond its boundaries, as
3
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suggested by phase 2 above, might both be 11:pheld and
still the court should hold that the city can not invade
the territory of an adjoining city, improvement district
or conservancy district, to compete with that district, in
the performance of that district's public functions.
The existence of municipal type districts in the State
of Utah and their boundaries is something which is within
the judicial knowledge of the court. In recent years population shifts from cities to suburban areas has required
the establishment of sewer systems, water systems and
other utility services in unincorporated areas. These
municipal districts are in most instances created in the
unincorporated areas immediately adjacent to cities.
They are _given the po\\~er of taxation and it is in most
instances their sole and only function to develop and
supply water or sewage facilities. If the adjoining cities
can go into the area embraced in these districts, and
engage in competing water and sewage business, it certainly would impair the ability of these districts to perform their established public functions. Such districts,
in the main, are :financed through the issuance of revenue
bonds. A revenue bond would be unmarketable if the
system were confronted with the possibility of competition from adjoining cities. Thus on the third phase the
district takes the position that it would be detrimental
to the public interest for one municipal taxing district
to have the authority to invade the terrtiory of another.
We are filing this brief without knowing the position which will be ta·ken by Salt Lake City in its brief,
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and the extent of the power which it will claim. 'V e
realize that the dismissal by the lower court was made
without trial, and that the decision in the lower court
probably is not on the merits. However, as the Supreme
Court expresses the law in response to the issues raised
by the appellants, principles of law will necessarily be
decided, and they will be established as the law of the
case binding upon us because we are a party. Because
there is no existing dispute between the Conservancy
District and Salt Lake City, there has been no effort on
the part of either to frame appropriate pleadings to
settle the respective powers of these two public organizations to operate retail water systems in the Conservancy District area. We believe that the issue could be
better presented to the court if the parties could have
directed their pleadings toward an existing problem with
all of the material facts being either alleged or proved.
The matter is, however, of great importance to all of
the municipal type districts, and many of the cities of
the state, and as a party to this suit, we believe we must
make our position known or run the risk of being forever
foreclosed from so doing.

ARGUMENT
I. THE CITY HAS NO AUTHORITY TO GO
BEYOND ITS BOUNDARIES EXCEPT TO MARKET A SURPLUS PRODUCT.
We believe that by placing emphasis on the problem
of Public Service Commission regulation, the appellants
almost bypassed what is to the Conservancy District the

5
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most important phase of this case. It involves the power
of a city to go into the water business generally. To
what extent may a city buy water from the Metropolitan
Water District or other sources for the purposes of engaging in commercial trade beyond its boundaries T
We think it clear under the authorities that the City,
in the absence of clear legislative grant, could not go
beyond its boundaries at all. There are a few states which
do uphold the power of a city to market its surplus product in the absence of statutory authority, but the over\Vhelming weight of authority is to the contrary. Where,
ho"rever, the City has no surplus and is attempting to
buy \Yater to go beyond its limits to engage in the water
business generally, the authorities are in harmony
against such a power in the city. There is even a serious
doubt that the I_;egislature could by express grant permit
the city so to do. Cities are formed to provide the various municipal functions for the benefit of their inhabitants. They have no power to utilize city funds to build
facilities and go into business outside the city.
The subject matter has been generally diseussed by
Dillon Municipal Corporations, 5th Edition, Volume 3,
Section 1299, wherein it is stated:
''The purpose for which a municipality is authorized to construct ·waterworks or to contract
for a supply of \Vater is usually to supply its own
needs and the needs of its inhabitants, and it may
be laid down as a general rule that a grant of
power to a municipality for these purposes gives
it by implication no authority to enter into the
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business of furnishing water to persons beyond
the municipal limits. Nor does authority to provide water or light for its own use and for the use
of its inhabitants authorize a municipality to go
into the business of buying and selling water as a
commodity to another municipality. But in the
absence of any constitutional provision or prohi. bition, it is within the power of the Legislature to
authorize a municipality, at least a.s an incident
to the constr~tction and maintenance of its o~vn
~cater works, to contract with neighboring municipalities to supply "\Vater to their inhabitants.''
Mc.Quillin on Corporations, 3rd Ed., Volume 12, Section 35.34 states:
''Grant of power generally to provide a water
supply for the inhabitants of a municipality does
not carry with it the right to furnish water to
inhabitants in other territories, and generally it
is held that a municipality which owns its water
or light plant has no implied authority to furnish
water or light beyond its territorial limits :r.= *. ''
>1{:

McQuillin does note a minority rule where the po,ver
to go beyond the boundaries to sell a surplus product
may be implied in the absence of a statutory prohibition.
The Utah Supreme Court has had numerous occasions to consider the question of the implied power of a
city to do various things. The rule of construction was
recently stated in Nasfell v. Ogden City, (Utah) 249 P.
(2d) 507. In that case Ogden had assumed that because
cities had been given the power to regulate streets and
the parking of vehicles for a fee, together with the gen·era.l power to enforce those powers, that the city neces7
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sarily had the implied power to pass an ordinanee, establishing a rule of evidence binding on the c.ourt. The
Supreme Court held that no such implied power existed
and said:
"We are committed to the principle that cities
have none of the elements of sovereignty, that
'any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation, (city) and the
power denied,' and that grants of power to cities
are strictly construed to the exclusion of implied
powers not reasonably necessary in carrying out
the purposes of the express powers granted.''
The court went on to enumerate numerous instances
in which the attempted exercise of an implied power has
been denied. This rule is so 'vell settled that there can
be no doubt that it is the settled law in Utah. For a fairly
recent case, see Nance c. Mayflower Cafe, 106 Utah 517,
150 P. (2d) 773. The court quoted with approval from
Dillon on Municipal Corporations that cities may exercise the following powers and no others : First, those
granted in express words. Second, those necessarily or
fairly implied or incident to the power expressly granted
and third, that the power is essential to the accomplishment of the declared objections and purposes of the corporation. It is noted that the powers thus implied are
not simply those convenient but rather those indispensable, and that any fair, reasonable or substantial doubt
concerning the existence of the power is resolved against
the city and the power is denied. After quoting this rule
from Dillon, the court noted that this rule has been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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quoted with approval in at least three prior Utah cases,
and that:
''From these authorities it appears clear that
cities have no inherent or original legislative
* if there is a reasonable doubt conpo,ver .x·
cerning an existence of a particular power that
doubt should be resolved against the city and the
pov1er should be denied.''
:!(•

See also, l)alt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P.
(2d) 537, where the rule is also stated and applied.
There must, in order to uphold the power of the
city to go in the water business generally in the County,
be a. legislative grant of power for the city to so do.
When 've turn to the statutes we find that by the provisions of Section 10-8-14, that cities are granted the power
to market their ''surplus product'' beyond city limits.
By ordinary rules of statutory construction, the express
grant of po,ver to market a surplus product by negative
implication denies the power to market a product unless
it is surplus. This section must, of course, also be read
against the backdrop of other statutes and constitutiona~
provisions. There is an express constitutional prohibition against cities selling their water rights. See Article
XI, Section 6. Contracts to suply water without regard
to it being surplus water have been held to be void as
violative of this section. See East Mill Creek Water Company v. City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P. (2d) 863, in which the
court expressly said that this Article XI, Section 6 would
prohibit the city from performing an agreement to deliver an unlimited quantity of water to inhabitants of an
9
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area without the city limits. That a city could not sell
either directly or indirectly any water right or water
source, and that a contract to deliver to non-residents at
points without the city limits all the water which those
individuals wanted would be violative of this constitutional provision.
There is a general grant of power to cities to appropriate moneys to acquire property for the benefit of the
city both within and without its corporate boundaries,
and to do all things in relationship thereto as natural
persons. See Section 10-8-2. The section goes on to
provide that it shall be deemed a corporate purpose to
appropriate money for any purpose "'"hich in the ''judgment of the Board of Commissioners will provide for
the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity
and improve the morals, peace, order, comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the city." This is a very
broad grant of power and still the Supreme Court has
held that the mere earning of a profit from commercial
trade does not come within it. Thus in .A1nerican Petroleum Co., et al. v. Ogden City, 90 Utah 465, 62 P. 2d 557,
the Supreme Court denied to Ogden the po'\\rer to sell
gasoline. The city urged that under the terms of the
above noted statute (10-8-2) it would promote the general welfare, etc. of the people. The court said:
"It is contended that this (the statute) authorizes the buying and selling of gasoline by the
municipality if for the convenience, comfort, and
prosperity of the inhabitants. It was held in Salt
Lake City v. Sutter, supra, that this proviso was

10
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limited by the clauses and provisions of the law
which specify the particular purposes for which
ordinances may be passed.''
The court went on to say that the power to enter into
the various commercial enterprises of this type would
have to come from the Legislature, and even suggested
that there may be some doubt that the Legislature has
the constitutional po\ver to confer it, because it says ''as
to the existence of such power in the Legislature we pass
no opini?n. ''
The court also construed this section in Bohn v. Salt
Lake City, 79 Utah 121, \vhere the city in order to promote employment during the Depression had set up unusual contract specifications vvhich would increase the
cost of the project but which would require the employ:..
ment of more men. 1-\.gain the sections of the statute
were noted, including the express power to construct
sewers. The court said :
''This express grant of power carries with it
those iNcidental powers necessarily and fairly
implied.''
The court also noted the general welfare clause quoted
above. The court then held that the city had no power
under the general welfare clause and the clause permitting it to install sewers to do so in a manner which woulcl
promote employment and increase the cost of the system.
The court has also held that the express power to construct, maintain, and operate street railways, carries
with it no implied power to operate motor busses, [Ttah
11
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Rapid Transit Company v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58
P. 2d 3. In view of these numerous holdings by our Utah
Supreme Court, we submit that the following is settled
law:
1. That the City has no inherent powers of sovereignty and can do nothing unless authorized so to do by
the Legislature.
2. That where a power is granted by the Legislature the grant of power should be strictly construed.
3. That if there is any reasonable d?ubt concerning
the existence of a power, the power should be denied.
In the instant case there is a constitutional provision
which expressly prohibits cities from selling beyond
their limits water in unlimited quantities, East Mill Creek
v. Salt Lake City, supra. There is an express statute
which authorizes the cities to sell their ''surplus product''
beyond their boundaries. By negative implication the
Legislature has thus said that they can not sell beyond
their boundaries anything but a surplus product. Certainly, if a grant of power to operate street railways
carries no power to operate motor busses, the power to
sell a ''surplus product'' does not by implication grant
the power to sell something which is not surplus. That is,
the power to buy water for resale.
It is fundamental that cities are organized for the
benefit of their inhabitants. The sale of surplus water
beyond their boundaries is primarily for the benefit of
their inhabitants. The development of a water supply
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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beyond the existing need is proper civic planning, and
rather than permit the water to run to waste or remain
unused it can be sold. The development of the supply
is for the primary purpose of meeting the needs of the
city. Its sale as a surplus product is purely incidental.
We seriously doubt that the Legislature could, under our
constitutional provisions, even grant the power to the
city to engage in commercial trade beyond its boundaries.
In the -'-lmerican Petroleum v. Ogden City case, supra,
the Supreme Court expressed the same doubt. The general rule against cities engaging in commercial trade is
stated in McQuillin on Corporations, Section 36.02, page
702, as follows :
''The objective of the creation of a municipal
corporation is that it may perform certain local
functions as a subordinate branch of government
and while it is invested with full power to do
everything necessarily incident to a proper discharge thereof, no right to do more can ever be
implied. In the absence of express legishitive
sanction, it has no authority to engage in any
independent business enterprise or occupation
such as is usually pursued by private individuals.''
There follows in McQuillin on Corporations numerous
examples of cases where cities have attempted to engage
in commercial trade and the power to do so has been
denied. There are several cases in which the distinction
which we seek here to make has been noted and upheld
in other states.

In Burough of East Newa.rk v. New York and New
Jersey Water Supply Company, 67 N.J. 265, 57 Atl. 1051,

13
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Jersey City·,vas buying water from a private water company for $35.00 per million gallons and selling it to other
towns for $90.00 per million gallons. The city was not
selling its surplus water but was buying water for resale.
The court held that the city had no such power. The case
holding is summarized in an annotation in 49 A.L.R.,
page 1243, as follows :
"A municipal corporation which buys all of
its water from a water company has no power to
sell a portion of the water so acquired to another
municipal corporation, though it may be authorized by statute·to sell waters to neighboring municipalities· when it has a water supply of its own
in excess of its needs.''
In Gage v. lVilmette, 233 Ill. Appeals 123, it was
held that while by express statute a city owning and
operating a plant for supplying water to its inhabitants
and taking water from its original source may sell water
"both within and without the city", a city buying its
water from another city is without power to resell that
water or distribute it outside its limits.
In a recent case of State v. Wylie, (Washington) 182
P. 2d 706, a public utility district, which is a municipal
type district in Washington, was by express statute
authorized to sell electric power, both \vithin and without
the confines of the district. Pursuant to this power, it
had the right to purchase property, both within and
without the district. The district in question encompassed
only one county. It proposed to buy the facilities of a
private utility which served eighteen counties. The SuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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preme Court of the State of Washington held that notwithstanding the express grant of power to serve beyond
its boundaries, the district had no power to go beyond its
boundaries on such a grandiose scale. It noted that its
primary purpose must necessarily be the furnishing of
power to its own inhabitants. If it had a surplus it could
as ~n incident to this primary power sell the same beyond
its boundaries. The court's opinion is very long and
toward the end of the opinion at page 726, it summarized
its opinion and said:
"Much that has been said has been by way of
explanation and argument, and, therefore, we
summarize the points that are here decided.
''The primary purpose of the power granted
to a public utility district "' * *· is to furnish the
district, and the inhabitants thereof, with electric
current for all uses, and, as an incident thereto,
it may furnish any other persons, including public
and private corporations, within or without its
limits, with such current for all uses.
''The right given under subsection (d) to construct, condemn, etc. :~: * * is subject to the limitation that the facilities acquired must not be unreasonably large or entirely inappropriate for the
accomplishment of that purpose.''
The court held, therefore, that even though the company was proceeding within the express letter of the law,
it violated the principle of municipal government for the
district to go in business almost throughout the state.
The primary purpose of furnishing its own inhabitants
would be pushed to the background and the sale beyond
the boundaries would be the primary purp9se. Even the
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dissenting judges approve the principle, but denied that
it was applicable to the facts there stated. On page 739
one of the dissenting judges said :
''The majority opinion impugns the good faith
of the public utility district, and everyone concerned in the plan by ascribing only to them an
incidental purpose of serving the electric needs
of their district, and arbitrarily holding that their
primary purpose is to go into the electric business
in territory beyond their boundaries. Neither the
record nor common sense warrants such a holding.''
See also Dyer v. N eu;port, 123 Ky. 203, 204 S.W. 25.
It ·was there said that \Vhile a city may sell its excess
water to outsiders, it can not contract to extend its system
of waterworks to an adjoining city. In this case, Clifton,
an adjoining municipality, passed an ordinance providing for the sale of the franchise for 40 years and for
laying water lines and mains in its streets. As was required by the Kentucky Constitution, bids were called
for by advertisement. The City of Newport submitted
a bid and was the successful bidder. It was held that
Newport could dispose of its surplus supply for its advantage, but it would not go into the business of maintaining works and operating franchises in and for the
benefit of an adjoining municipality without express
legislative authority.
In Nephi v. Telluride, Case No. 3516, before the Public Service Commission of Utah, the Commission prohibited the City of Nephi from purchasing electric power
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from Utah Power & Light for resale beyond its
ar1es.

bound~

See also, Hyre v. Brown,. 102 W. Va. 505, 135 S.E.
656, 49 A.L.R. 1230, where the court said:
' ' The exception to the general rule is that
there is implied power to furnish an excess commodity to outs~ders where the city has such commodity in the exercise of an authorized proprietary undertaking, under the theory that it is 'good
business'. The instant case does not fall within
the exception noted, for there is no suggestion
herein of surplus commodity, or good business.'
We respectfully submit that the city can not engage
in commercial trade simply because it thinks it can make
a profit thereon. It can not use City money to build
facilities in the County except to market a surplus
product developed for the primary purpose of meeting
the future needs of its people. Since the inhabitants of
the City have the primary demand on its water, because
of Article XI, Section 6, people outside the city are always subjected to the risk that they will build their
homes in reliance on a water supply which the City may
be required to take from them. Even the Metropolitan
Water District is required to give the City the prior
right to purchase its water. It is thus both detrimental
to the welfare of the people of Salt Lake City and to the
people it serves to have it engage in commercial trade
beyond its boundaries.
It is contrary to fundamental concepts of Government for cities and governments generally to engage in
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commercial trade. If the City finds it profitable to go
into the water business in the County because it has a
good water department, there is no logical reason why
it can not use its street department to engage in the
private contracting business in the County or throughout the State. It has trucks and various other types of
road building equipment. It must maintain that equipment to maintain its streets. It might be able to devote
that equipment to the building of gutters, sidewalks and
streets in private subdivisions in the County, or it might
even build roads for the State Road Commission throug4out the State. The people of Salt· Lake City would be
benefited if this proved to be profitable, but it is fundamental that the City c.an not do this, and it is equally
fundamental that it should not be permitted to engage
in the.sale of water, power or any other commodity except
as an incident to the disposal of its surplus supply built
up to meet the reasonable future needs of the City. Even
the case of Muir v. Murray City, 55 Utah 360, 186 P. 433,
wherein the power to market a surplus beyond its bounddaries is upheld, there is a strong implication that the
City can not engage in commercial trade except for the
disposal of a surplus product. This problem is of wide
public importance. We think the allegations of the complaint fairly allege that the City is purchasing water from
Metropolitan for resale in the County. If the court deems
it necessary_ to decide this issue, it would certainly be
detrimental to the interests of the Conservancy District
if the court were to uphold the general power of the City
to go into the County and develop water supplies and
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purchase water sources and water itself for the sole purpose of engaging in commercial trade within the confines
of the Conservancy District and in competition with it.
II. EVEN IN THE SALE OF ITS SURPLUS WATER
BEYOND ITS BOUNDARIES THE CITY IS SUBJECT TO REGULATION.
(a)

Regulation by the Courts.

The appellants here have confined the question of
regulation to regulation by the Public Service Commission. We think the principle is broader than that. Even
if the court should conclude that under our constitutional
provisions and our statutes, the City is beyond the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission, certainly it is
not without any restraint. There is a well-established
common law rule that one who engages in a business
affected. with a public interest must not adopt unreasonable rates or rules and regulations. There .is inherent
in the powers of the courts the jurisdiction to prohibit
abuses by one who has engaged in the furnishing of
utility service.
The Utah Supreme Court has already committed
itself on this doctrine. In the case of Home Owners' Loan
Corporation v. Logan City, 97 Utah 235, 92 P. ( 2d) 346,
the court held that cities, even in the sale of water to
their own inhabitants must adopt reasonable rules and
regulations or otherwise the rule is void. This case must
be considered against the background of the constitu-
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tional proVIsion, Article. VI, Section 29, which grants
to cities home rule over their municipal functions. It
also must be considered in the light of the statute
(10-7-10, U.C.A. 1953), which expressly provided that a
city would not be required to furnish water for use in
any house unless the application for service was signed
by the owner, and the following sections which permitted
the city to terminate service for failure to comply with
the rules, and partictiarly Section 10-7-14, which provided:
''Every city and to,vn may enact ordinances,
rules and regulations for the management and
conduct of the water,vorks system owned or controlled by it.''
· Notwithstanding the constitutional prov1s1on and
these express statutory powers, the Supreme Court
issued a 'vrit of mandamus to compel a. town .to connect
one of its inhabitants to t~e town system. In so doing
the court said :
''In the very recent case of Home Owners'
Loan Corporation v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, supra, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had before it the same situation as exists in
the present case. Mandamus was brought by the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation to compel the
City of Baltimore to supply water to certain
premises owned by the plaintiff. The lower court
dismissed the petition, and an appeal was taken.
On appeal the judgment of the lower court was
reversed, the Court of Appeals holding that 'if
the purpose and intent' of the municipal water
company's rules 'was to authorize the corporation to discontinue its service to property because
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the owner thereof failed or refused to pay the
water rent due for service to a former owner, the
rule was unreasonable and void. (Citing cases)'
''The theory on which mandamus will lie appears to be that an applicant is not unde·r the duty
of complying with unreasonable rules or unlawful
regulations in order to obtain the service of a
public service corporation (or a municipality acting in the same capacity). The fact that he may
submit to such unlawful regulation by paying the
assessed charges under protest and suing to recover the money thus paid on the grounds that the
regulation was unlawful, does not establish that
he has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at
law. Mandamus was, therefore proper in this
case.''
In view of this holding, there. can be no doubt that
Utah is presently committed to the doctrine that cities
in the furnishing of service even to their own residents
must adopt rules and regulations which are reasonable
and not discriminatory. If such a rule is correct as to
service to its inhabtiants, a fortiori the rule must be
applied to service beyond its boundaries where in the
more literal sense it is embarking in the utility business
as distinguished from the performance of a municipal
function. The rule that courts have the inherent power
to enforce the common law rule is followed by many
states. A corporation which devotes its property to the
furnishing of a utility service is affected by a public
interest, and since the very early case of M unn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77, the courts have upheld their
right to regulate the rates. Our Utah Supreme Court
in Utah Power db Light Company v. Public Service Com21
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m~ssion, 107 ·utah 155, 15.2

P. (2d) 542, commented on the
Munn v. Illinois case, and stated the rule as follo"rs:
"It was further
that 'Property does
interest when used
public consequence,
large.'

stated (in Munn v. Illinois)
become clothed with a public
in a manner to make it of
and affect the community at

''And when devoted to public use, the owner in
effect grants the public an interest and must subject .himself to regulation. ''
·
Thus in Home Owners Loan case, supra, the Supreme
Court squarely held that this common law rule applies
to cities engaged in the sale of water. The subject is
covered generally by an annotation in 127 A.L.R., beginning at page 101, wherein it is stated:
.. ''The power of courts to pass upon the reasonableness of the rates fixed for services rendered
by a municipally owned or operated public utility
has been more often recognized in affirmative
action in that regard than discussed.''
Numerous cases are cited wherein courts have
assumed the power to regulate utility fees by municipalities.
In a rece11t case, to-wit, City of Texarkam,a v. Wiggins, (Texas) 246 S.W. (2d) 622, the court squarely hel~
that it had the power to regulate rates of a municipal
corporation as to sales beyond its boundaries. The City
·of Texarkana was selling ·water beyond its boundaries.
It charged one rate for service within the city and a rate
double the city rate ·for service without the city. The
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court said that there is a common law rule that one
engaged in rendering a service affected with a l>u~lic
interest may not discriminate in charges or services as
between persons similarly· situated; that this common
law rule is one of long standing and is so well recognized
that no citation of authority to support it is necessary.
The court in a rather detailed opinion held that the
common law rule was in effect in T-exas and that an
ordinance charging double rates to people outside the
city was void unless the city on new trial could show a
reasonable basis for the difference in rates.
We take the position that the City, in sales beyond
its boundary is subject either to (a) regulation by the
Public Service Commission, or (b) to the common law
rule that one engaged in a service affected with a public
interest must establish reasonable rates, and can not
discriminate or establish unreasonable regulations. As
to regulation by the Public Service Commission, the Utah
Commission has already so held in the Bayles case, infra.
As to common law rule, the Utah Supreme Court has
already applied it in the Logan City case, supra.
(b)

Regulation by Public Service Commission.

We concur with the argument of appellants to the
effect that a city in selling beyond its boundaries should
be regulated by the Public Service Commission.
In the absence of statute as noted above, most of
the states hold that a city has no power to sell its surplus
water beyond its boundaries. (McQuillin on _Corpora..
23
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tions, Third Edition, Section 35.34). ·There is however,
an express statute in Utah, Section 10-8-14, U.C.A. 1953.
This section provides that cities may sell and deliver its
surplus water not required by the city or its inhabitants
to others beyond its limits. This power has been upheld
in the case of Muir v. Murray City, 55 Utah 568, 186 P.
483, and was recognized in Hyde Park v. Chwmbers, 99
Utah 118, 104 P. (2d) 220. The general power can not,
therefore, be denied.
While the Utah Court has held in Hom.e Owners
Loan v. Logarn City, supra, that cities are subject to
regulation by the courts, the Supreme Court has never
squarely passed on the question of whether the Public
Service Commission may regulate cities in the sale of
utility products beyond the city limits. The matter has,
however, been squarely presented to our Public Service
Commission in Re. Bayles, et al., P.U.R. (1926) A, page
731, and the problem was incidentally involved in the
case of Utah Power & Light and Telluride Power Company v. Public Service Commission of Utah, and Nephi
City, ______ Utah ______ , 249 P. (2d) 951.

The Utah Authorities:
In re Ba.yles, a group of eighteen individuals desired
to purchase power from the City of Parowan. This
group, all of which resided outside the· city, proposed
to construct a power line to the city limits and to there
purchase power for t_ransmission and use it at their
farms. At first ,the City of Parowan was not made a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

party. The Public Service Commission indicated that it
had no jurisdiction over the eighteen individuals, because they were not purporting to go into the business
of selling power ; they were merely going to purchase
power for their own use, and consequently were not
under the jurisdiction of the Commission. The City of
Parowan was then made a party. The eighteen individuals were residing within the franchise area of Dixie
Power Company, a public utility. The Commission
prohibited the sale of power by Parowan City to the
eighteen individuals. In so holding the Commission said:
''The evidence was to the effect that the petitioners proposed to engage in the .power business
as a personal matter, not as a public service corporation, but merely to serve their several farms.
''This being so, the Commission would have no
jurisdiction whatever. It would be nothing more
than a mutual arrangement among these individuals to purchase power from the city and then
to use it as they would have a perfect right to do
for pumping water for their separate farms.
''On the other hand, Parowan City, in selling
power to the petitioners, as individuals, would,
however, come under the jurisdiction of the Commission.
''Similarly, the Dixie Power Company would
be "\\rithin its legal right as a protestant against
the sale of power by Parowan City beyond the
corporation limits.
"After some discussion it was agreed that
Parowan City be made a party defendant in the
case, and it was so ordered by the Commission.
* * :11:
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·"While the·lower·r·ate by Parowan to Bayles
and others would have inured to its advantage for
the present, .the Commission is compelled to take
into consideration the effect that granting this
petition would have upon the users of power and
light in the balance of the territory occupied by
the Dixie Power Company. • • *
"It being the duty of Parowan to serve its
inhabitants first, this contract would exist only
until.such time as a market developed for the surplus power within the corporate limits.
''If the original petition were granted, Parowan City, in this special instance, would, with
res.pect to its sale· of power to others than the
inhabitants thereof, become a utility, proposing
to -enter the field already occupied by another
utility.''
Thus, the sale to Bayles, et al. was prohibited and
the Public Service Commission of Utah expressly ruled
that· in the sale of power by Parowan to customers beyond its boundaries it was a public utility, subject to
regulation by the Public· Service Commission, and that
it could not be permitted to invade the franchise area of
the Dixie Power Company.
In the case of Utah Power ct Light Company and
Telluride Power Company v. Public Service Commission
of Utah and Nephi City, supra, Nephi City wanted to
buy power from Utah Power & Light Company, which
was located some seven miles from the Nephi City boundary .. Nephi City was completely surrounded by the
franchise area of Telluride Power Company. Nephi City
o"\\rned its own municipal plant, but needed to acquire
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supplemental power. It had for a period of years been
purchasing from Telluride, but on the expiration of its
contract with Telluride it desired to buy its supplemental
power from Utah Power & Light Company. The Bayles
case was cited in the briefs by Telluride as an authority
prohibiting Utah Power & Light Company from selling
power to Nephi. The brief of Nephi distinguished the
Bayles case, on the grounds that it involved a sale·by a
city outside of its boundaries, while the Nephi case involved an effort by Nephi to buy power only to serve
within its boundaries. The Supreme Court had no necessity for passing on the point raised here, but its opinion,
which is carefully worded, is restricted to the right of
Nephi City to have ''self rule within its boundaries.''
The court quoted with approval from a case decided by
the Idaho Public Service Commission. Idaho, by statute,
had granted cities self rule, as our constitution does, and
the case was placed squarely on the grounds that municipalities had been exempted from the jurisdiction of
the Public Service Commission as effectively as though
the territory 11 within the municipality'' had been lifted
bodily and set down without the confines of the State.
In other words, the ''self rule'' granted to the cities was
limited to service within Nephi's own territory.
Nephi City was selling some power beyond its boundaries, and the file, which is No. 3516, before the Commission, reflects an objection on the part of Telluride
to Nephi's purchase of power for resale beyond its
boundaries. The Public Service Commission, in the issuance of its order, expressly limited the City to the pur-
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chase of power for use by its own inhabitants within
its own area. The Commission also ordered ''that the
contract between Nephi City and Utah Power must conform to the Commission's rules and must be approved
by the Commission. ''
It would, therefore, appear that our Public Service
Commission is presently committed to the doctrine that
when a city purports to serve beyond its boundaries it
loses its "immunity" from regulation and becomes subject to the rules and regulations of the Public Service
Commission, and the Supreme Court has been careful in
its application of the "self rule" doctrine, to restrict
the self rule to service within the territorial limit~ of
the city.

Authorities from other States:
The general power of a city to sell beyond its boundaries and the power of public service commissions over
such sales has been a frequent subject of litigation
throughout the nation. The subject is .treated generally
in McQuillin on Corporations, 3rd Edition, Volume 12,
Sections 34.146 and 35.34, and is annotated in 127 A.L.R.
94. In the early cases the authorities seem to be quite
uniform in their holding that when a city engages in th~
sale of its surplus product beyond the city limits it
becomes a utility, subject to regulation. See for example,
the collection of cases in the Public Utility Reports
Digest, under "Municipal Plants", subsection 11. The
Arizona Public Service Commission rather consistently
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held that cities selling beyond their boundaries were
subject to regulation by the· Utilities Commission. See,
for example, Harber v. Phoenix, P.U.R. (1918) D 342.
Thereafter amendments were made to the Arizona statutes. The court thus noted in City of Phoenix v. Wright,
(Arizona) 80 P. (2d) 390, that in 1934 the Legislature
had expressly provided that any municipality had the
power to sell outside its limits. The argument was made
that even though they had the power to sell beyond their
boundaries those sales became subject to the Public
Service Commission regulation. The court said this was
a plausible but not tenable argument, because of the
provision of Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which expressly excluded municipal corporations from
regulation by the Public Service Commission. Arizona
has since consistently held that cities selling beyond their
boundaries are not subject to regulation by the Public
Service Commission.
In Colorado the Supreme Court held in La.Mar v.
Wiley, 80 Colo. 18, 248 Pac. 1009 that the Commission and
not the city has the power to :fix the rates of a municipally owned public utility for service to customers outside the City. Thereafter the Public Service Commission
consistently exercised jurisdiction over the various
municipally owned plants furnishing services beyond
their boundaries. See the P.U.R. Digest under the index
''Municipal Plants'', Section 11. Then in City of Englewood v. City and County of Denver, (Colorado) 229 P.
(2d) 667, the court held that by reason of the wording
of the Colorado statutes and Constitution, cities were
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immune from· regulation by the utilities commission.
The statute in question expressly provided that cities
could sell water to outside consumers and then provided
that the cities had the power ''to collect therefor such
charges and upon such conditions arnd limitations as said
towns and cities ma.y impose by ordinance.'' The Constitution, Article V, Section 35, prohibited the delegation
to any special commission, of the power to interfere with
any municipal improvement. The court also was impressed by the fact that the power of cities to sell beyond
their boundaries was granted in 1911 and the Public
Utilities Act was not enacted until 1913. The court was
unwilling to consider the public utility act as an implied
repeal of the legislative grant to cities of (a) the power
to sell beyond their boundaries, and (b) the power to
fix the rates to be charged and the conditions to be
imposed by ordinance.
In the State of Washington the Legislature in 1917
granted cities power to extend water systems beyond
their corporate limits and expressly provided that such
portion of the system as extends beyond the corporate
limits of the city "shall be operated at such prices and
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed
by the Public Service Commission.'' In 1933 this was
repealed and in its place it was provided that the municipality furnishing beyond its limits could by contract
fix the terms upon which the outside distribution system
will be installed and the rates and the manner of services
rendered. In view of this express legislation, the Washington court held in West Side Improvement Club v.
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Department of Public Service, (Washington), 58 P. (2d)
350, that cities are beyond the control of the Public
Service Commission.
Thus, in the absence of a consideration of express
statutes, Arizona, Washington and Colorado, in the beginning, all had upheld the power of the Commission to
regulate cities in sales beyond their boundaries. Later
because of express legislative power on the part of cities
to sell beyond their boundaries and to fix the rates for
and the ter1ns of the services, they now deny the power
of the Public Service Commission to regulate cities selling beyond their boundaries.
There are, on the other hand, a great number of
cases holding under the statutes of the States there involved that cities do become subject to regulation by the
Public Service Commission when they sell beyond their
boundaries.
In Kentucky a statute expressly provided that ''public utilities'' means any person ''except a water district
organized under Chapter 74, or a city who owns, controls,
operates or manages any facility used or to be used for
or in connection with the diverting * * * or furnishing
of water to or for the public for compensation.'' It was
argued that this express statutory exemption of cities
exempted the city from control of the Public Service
Commission. The Kentucky Supreme Court said in
connection with supplying of electrical energy beyond
the city in Olive Hill v. Public Service Co~mmission, 305
Ky. 248, 203 S.W. (2d) 68, that:
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''When the city supplies current outside its
corporate limits its exemption as to rates and
regulation by the Commission ceased and the city
came within the jurisdiction of the Commission
and was subject to such regulation by it.''
Later in Louisville Water Company v. Preston Street
Road Water District, 256 S.W. (2d) 26, the court said
that the identical principle should be applied in regard
to the sale of water beyond the city boundaries.
For other states upholding the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission to regulate cities insofar as
sales beyond their corporate limits is concerned, see the
Annotation in 127 A.L.R. at page 96, under the heading,
"Where Service is Rendered Outside Corporate Limits".
States upholding the power of regulation include Shirk
v. Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169 Atl. 557, 90 A.L.R. 688,
(in which it was said that in supplying water to corporations and individuals outside the city applicable rates of
a municipal plant are subject to the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission, although prescribed by city
ordinance) ; V alcour v. Morrisville, 110 Vt. 93, 2 Atl.
(2d) 312; Wheeling v. Benwood McMecham Water Company, 115 W. Va. 353, 176 S.E. 234; J. Greenbaum T·anning Company v. Railroad Commission, 194 Wis. 634,
217 N.W. 282. Also are cited commission decisions from
Colorado, ~Iissouri, Montana, Nebraska and Utah. See
also the recent Wyoming case, Moore v. Town of Evansville, 95 P.U.R. (N.S.) 357, where the Wyoming Co~
mission held that ''the Commission has jurisdiction over
the extra-territorial service of a municipal plant, even
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

though the plant does not have statutory authority to
render the same, and the fact that service may not be
compelled by persons residing outside the corporate
limits as a matter of right does not deprive the Commission of that jurisdiction. ''
In the same annotation (127 A.L.R. page 96) at page
100 are collected cases denying the power of a commission to regulate the extra-territorial service of a city.
The cases cited there include the Arizona and Washington cases referred to above.
It thus appears that the authorities are not uniform.
Each state has placed its decision on the particular
statutes of that state. The Public Service Commission
of Utah has already committed itself in the Bayles case
and the Nephi City case to the proposition that it does
have jurisdiction over the extra-territorial service of
cities. The Utah court has carefully confined its rulings
upholding the city's right to self rule t9 service within
its boundaries and to its inhabitants.
The Utah statutes certainly purport to cover municipalities. In Section 54-2-1, subsection 3, corporations
are expressly defined as including ''municipal corporations". It is also provided that "municipal corporations'' include cities, counties and towns. Subsection 26
states that water corporations _include every corporation
operating or managing a water system for public service.
The Supreme Court noted, in City of St. George v. Public
Utilities Commission, 62 Utah 453, 220 Pac. 720, that
33
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municipal "corporations are expressly included . in this
act, and the contention that regulation of rates was
limited to rates affecting the ''public'' as distinguished
from municipal corporations· was without merit.
It is further provided by Section 54-4-1 that the
Commission is vested with power and jurisdiction to
supervise and regulate every public utility in this State.
Since public utilities are · defined to include municipal
corporations,: it would seem clear that the statutes purport to regulate cities_ to the extent that the Legislature
has the power to so do. The basis of the holdings that
cities are beyond" regulation comes from the provisions
of Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution which
provides that the Legislature shall not delegate to any
special commission power to supervise ''any municipal
improvement * * * or to perform any municipal functions.'' The Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission,
72 Uta.h 536, 271 Pac. 961, and Utah Power mLight v.
Nephi City, · supra, cases, in which the Public Service
Commission is denied the power to regulate cities are
both expressly confined to service within the corporate
limits to inhabitants of the city.
The entire philosophy of public utility regulation
was-to pro-hibit agencies not responsive to the will of the
people by election or otherwise from monopolizing the
field a.nd fixing rates at unreasonable levels or on ·a discriminatory basis. Inhabitants within a city can prevent
abuses through orderly elective proceedings, and even
within a city where self rule is recognized and granted,
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the courts have denied the City the right to discriminate
or withhold service. Home Owners Loan v. Logan City,
97 Utah 235, 92 P. ( 2d) 346, supra.
Thus while the City has by express statutory provision been permitted to sell its "surplus" product beyond its boundaries, it would be contrary to sound public
policy to permit the city to dump its surplus on the
market in competition with established utilities or other
municipal districts or to establish discriminatory or excessive rates. Certainly regulation in these extra-territorial sales is desirable and reasonable. There is ample
authority from other jurisdictions upholding the power
of regulation under statutes similar to ours. The Public
Service Commission has already in the Bayles case and
the Nephi City case held that it has jurisdiction over
cities on their outside sales, and this court should so
hold.

•

III. THE CITY HAS NO POWER TO INVADE THE
TERRITORY OF THE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
AND IMPAIR THE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT'S
PERFORMANCE OF ITS FUNCTIONS.
Salt Lake City was extensively in the water business
in the East Bench Area 'vith many water lines and many
customers when the Conservancy District was created.
The Conservancy District at this moment does not have
the financial strength nor a supply of water adequate to
permit it to take over the entire territory presently being
served by Salt Lake City. The two public bodies are not
35
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engaging in ru1nous competition and have no existing
quarrel. In submitting this brief we are not urging the
court to pass upon issues involving the respective powers
of the conservancy district and the city. We feel, however, that in passing on the issues raised by the appellant, the court may determine that it is necessary to rule
on the powers of the city as they relate to the other
parties to this· suit. We doubt very much that the city
would ever attempt to go beyond its boundaries with
extensive new construction or attempt to usurp the
public functions of the District. Certainly at the moment
it is not doing so, and we hope that in its brief it will not
assert that it has that power. We, nevertheless, feel
that if this issue is to be ruled on by the court that it
would be detrimental to the interests of the Conservancy
district for the City to be given the power to enter the
District and to usurp its functions. It must be remembered that the Conservancy District has as its primary
function the supplying of water to inhabitants. But for
that function it would have no justification for its existence. Its general power to levy taxes is limited to that
purpose and that purpose would be defeated if other
arms of the State Government can compete with and
usurp its functions within its own territory.
Conservancy Districts are by statute granted numerous express powers which are designed to enable
them to supply water to both the incorporated and unincorporated areas within its limits, and the statutes themselves suggest that cities may not expand their boundaries into the Conservancy District and compete for cusSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tomers. The powers section of the Conservancy District
act is Section 79-9-13, U.C.A. 1953, as the same was extensively amended by Laws of Utah 1953, Chapter 132.
Subsection (b) grants the District power to construct waterworks and facilities and to acquire water
rights. Subsection (c) grants the power of eminent
domain. Subsection (d) grants the power to maintain
works along all public streets and highways, and prohibits cities from requiring a permit for using or occupying the streets. Then in 1953 amendments were made
dealing with the elimination of competition between
cities and conservancy districts. Subsection ( q) expressly provides that conservancy districts may sell
water to individual customers and fix the rates therefor.
But this grant of power contains the proviso:
"that no such sale of water for domestic or culinary use shall be made to a customer located
within the limits of an incorporated municipality
at the time of the creation of the district and at
the time of the service without the consent of such
municipality.''
Subsection (q) of the 1953 amendment was enacted
with the problems of Salt Lake County and Weber
County conservancy districts in mind. Each of them
embraces within its limits numerous incorporated cities
and towns. The likelihood of the conservancy district
going into the retail water business within the confines
of those cities and towns presented an immediate problem, because some of the cities and towns do not own
their own water systems. These districts were con-
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fronted with the problem of cities expanding their boundaries into the· district in competition with the District.
It was thus provided that the Conservancy District could
not' sell direct to individual customers within the existing
boundaries ·of existing towns without the consent of the
town. It was ·recognized,· however, that town boundaries
might expand. If the town expanded its boundaries into
an area not being served.by the Conservancy District at
the time of the territorial expansion, then that area also
.
.
could only be served retail by the district if the City
consented. It was also recognized that Conservancy Districts might be selling to inP.ividual customers immediately adjacent to a town but outside the present town's
limits, that the town would expand to take in that area
and try to exclude the District. Therefore, subsection
( q) provides that no consent of the municipality would
be needed if at the ·time of the ere a tion of the district
and at the time service was established the area wa.s
outside the town. Thus, the Legislature had at least one
phase of this problem in mind when subsection ( q) was
adopted. The intentionto eliminate competition between
conservancy districts and towns which they embrace or
adjoin in the service of water on a retail basis to individual customers is certainly expressed.
In Long v. Town of Thatcher, (Arizona.) 153 P. (2d)
1953, the Town of Thatcher proposed to buy an existing
"\Vater system. This system. served the Town of Thatcher
and also the Town ·of Safford. The Town of Thatcher
proposed to issue revenue bonds to acquire the system,.
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and proposed to operate the same both within its own
boundaries and within the Town of Safford.
The Arizona statutes expressly provided that a
municipality could engage in any business or enterprise
that a person, firm or corporation may engage in by
virtue of a franchise from the municipality. The statutes
also gave it po"rer to construct within or without its
corporate limits and to operate and maintain any utility
undertaking and to purchase water rights. The court
noted that there could be no question concerning the
right of a municipality to operate outside its corporate
limits. The court then noted that a very important
matter to be considered in this case was that the Town
of Safford, under Arizona law, when accepting its electric power from the Town of Thatcher, would be entitled
to only the surplus power of Thatcher. The Town of
Thatcher would also be immune from paying taxes to
the Town of Safford. The court then held that the statute which gave the town of Thatcher its power to engage
in any utility business within or without its corporate
limits did not give it the power to invade the corporate
limits of another municipality. Both the utility and the
Town of Thatcher were, therefore, enjoined from completing the sale.
The same principle was applied in the case of City
of New Braunfels v. City of San .Antonio, 212 S.W. (2d)
817. Several cases, including the above cited Arizona
case, are· analyzed and then the court said:
39
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"We repeat our holding that the City of San
Antonio has no lawful right to interfere with or
encroach upon any incidental or statutory power
or duty belonging to the City of New Braunfels.
Should it attempt to do so, the courts will be open
to grant redress.''
It is detrimental to the people of any area to be
dependent upon a surplus supply of water. When the
surplus is needed by the City, the City has a preferential
right to take it and a duty to its citizens to take it.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted: (1) That
cities can not go beyond their boundaries to engage in
commercial trade and buy and sell water; (2) that even
on its surplus product, it is subject (a) to regulation by
the courts and (b) to regulation by the Public Service
Commission; and (3) that it can not without the consent
of a municipal district invade its territory and usurp
its functions.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorney for The Salt Lake
County f!Vater Conservancy
District
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